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The 2006 FIFA World Cup was held in 12 German cities between 9 
June and 9 July 2006. We identified a need to accelerate and sensitise 
the pre-existing surveillance system for infectious diseases in order to 
timely detect adverse health events during the World Cup. Enhanced 
surveillance, based on Germany’s pre-existing system of mandatory 
notifications was conducted between 7 June and 11July 2006 in the 
12 World Cup cities by: accelerating frequency of electronic data 
transmission of case-definition based notifiable diseases from weekly 
to daily transmission, additional reporting of non-case definition-based 
infectious disease events, lay and expert press screening and intensifying 
communication between all stakeholders of the surveillance system. 
Median delay of notification data transmission from the community to 
the federal level was reduced from three days to one day. The enhanced 
reporting system detected a norovirus outbreak in the International 
Broadcast Centre in Munich with 61 epidemiologically linked cases 
within the first week after onset, as well as four single cases related 
to the World Cup, two of them with relevance for the International 
Health Regulations. After the World Cup, all surveillance stakeholders 
agreed that communication between local, state and federal levels 
had improved considerably. Unlike the majority of health planners 
of previous mass gatherings in the last decade we did not introduce 
syndromic surveillance. Nevertheless, enhancement of infectious 
disease surveillance successfully detected adverse health events in a 
timely manner during the FIFA World Cup. Additionally, it provided a 
valuable communication and networking exercise for potentially critical 
health-related events. We recommend continuing daily notification data 
transmission for routine infectious disease surveillance in Germany.
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Introduction
The FIFA World Cup was held between 9 June and 9 July 9 2006 in 12 
cities within nine federal states of Germany. According to preliminary 
reports of the Federal Office for Statistics, this international sporting 
event resulted in 2 million additional overnight stays from abroad. 
Although serious medical illness during mass gatherings is 
uncommon [1] and recent mass gatherings such as the Olympic 
Games and previous World Cups have not been associated with an 
increased number of infectious disease outbreaks [2-9], security 
threats and the recent emergence of avian influenza in Europe have 
heightened the profile of and need for a good surveillance strategy 
during such events.
The two main rationales for enhanced infectious disease 
surveillance at mass events include a perceived increased risk of 
infectious disease events, and a need to detect and respond to events 
more quickly, due to the short-lived nature of infectious diseases. 
Moreover, the requirements of the International Health Regulations 
(IHR) issued by the World Health Organization (WHO), which take 
effect in mid-2007, define the need for timely reporting of infectious 
diseases during international mass events [10].
Methods
An enhanced surveillance system for infectious diseases based on the 
existing German system of mandatory notifications and reporting was 
conducted between 7 June and 11 July. In brief, the enhanced surveillance 
system for the World Cup consisted of four major branches:
Acceleration of data transmission in the pre-existing, electronic 
notifiable-disease reporting system using existing case 
definitions.
Introduction of an additional free-text reporting system for 
relevant public health events, with ‘relevant events’ being defined 
individually by local and state health departments, and not 
necessarily based on case definitions.
Monitoring of domestic and international media sources for 
epidemiological events that could be relevant to the World Cup
Strengthening communication and interaction between the 
different public health stakeholders within Germany and 
internationally. 
The system was designed to detect adverse health events of public 
health relevance in a timely fashion during the 2006 FIFA World Cup 
in the area under surveillance (the 12 World Cup cities). 
The first branch of enhanced surveillance, acceleration of the 
data transmission process was accomplished by increasing the usual 
weekly transmission frequency of mandatory notification data 
to daily transmission (Monday to Saturday, excluding holidays) 
within the 12 World Cup cities and a few other cities that had been 
identified as relevant focal points by the State Health Department 
(SHD). Such relevant focal points could be cities neighbouring the 
World Cup cities, where World Cup-related mass gatherings such 
as public televised screenings took place. Mandatory notifications 
were transmitted from the local health department to their respective 
state health department and from there to the Robert Koch-Institut 
(RKI) on the same working day. In accordance to the pre-existing 
weekly procedure, data transmission was electronic and anonymous. 
Underlying case definitions for transmission of data (and therewith the 
underlying specificities) were not altered for the purpose of accelerated 
transmission. Cases not investigated and confirmed according to the 
pre-existing case definitions were not transmitted until they met the 
standard case-definitions for inclusion in the data. 
Two additional modifications were made to the existing electronic 
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residents of Germany, which are not routinely reported. Also, a 
‘World Cup-related’ flag was created in the electronic data systems. 
Any case related to a World Cup event (such as spending time in a 
stadium, at public screening, or in the ‘fan mile’ areas set up within the 
World Cup cities) was flagged at the sole discretion of the local health 
departments based on their intimate knowledge of local events.
In the second branch of our enhanced strategy, a new reporting 
system was introduced. Information on outbreaks, clusters or any 
type of ‘relevant’ public health event was sent from the local and state 
health departments to the RKI in a standardised, free-text written 
report. Relevancy to the World Cup was determined by the sole and 
subjective judgement of the local health departments. In an effort to 
increase the sensitivity of the surveillance system, the information 
contained in these daily reports was not based on case definitions 
for mandatory notifications. 
In the third branch of surveillance, international and German 
lay press and expert sources (ProMED-mail, the European Centre 
for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), the United States 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the World 
Health Organization, etc.) were screened daily by the World Cup 
surveillance team at the RKI for infectious disease issues of public 
health relevance. Lay press sources were pre-screened daily with the 
help of an automatic press screening service after applying sensitive 
search terms relevant for infectious disease issues.
Regular telephone conferences were held in order to strengthen 
communication and outcome-orientated interaction between the 
stakeholders of the enhanced World Cup surveillance (local and state 
health departments and RKI). These telephone conferences also served 
as a tool for quality management, where questions and suggestions 
for process optimisation were discussed and documented. Also, 
information of international public health concern was exchanged in a 
daily telephone conference with the ECDC’s Unit for Preparedness and 
Response. Discrepancies between different information sources (for 
example, between local health department reports and press sources) 
were clarified in these discussions. This strengthened communication 
system represented our fourth branch of surveillance. 
Surveillance activities were coordinated by the RKI in cooperation 
with the 12 local health departments and nine state health 
departments affiliated with World Cup cities. 
The RKI produced a daily report on the status of infectious disease 
epidemiology. Sources of information included all four branches of 
our strategy as well as weather data (daily temperatures) provided 
by the Deutscher Wetterdienst (German Meteorological Office) to 
provide prospective for outbreaks and other public health situations, 
in light of the European heat wave of 2003 [11]. In a final, summarised 
RKI daily report, the domestic and international infectious disease 
situation was assessed for eventual public health threats with 
relevance for the World Cup. The RKI daily report was distributed 
on the same afternoon to the local and state health departments, 
the German Ministries of Health and the Nationales Informations-
und Kooperationszentrum (National Information and Cooperation 
Centre), which was the national security communication hub for the 
World Cup. An extended version was uploaded daily onto a restricted-
access web-based communication and information forum for German 
public health institutions, and a short version was published daily on 
the public webpage of the RKI in both English and German.
All components of the enhanced World Cup surveillance were 
tested during a trial week in May 2006, involving all World Cup 
surveillance stakeholders.
After the World Cup, a preliminary analysis of aggregated 
mandatory notification data was undertaken in order to assess 
whether daily versus weekly data transmission actually influenced 
the mean data transmission delay from the LDH in the World Cup 
cities to RKI. 
We compared transmission delay in days (25th, 50th and 75th 
percentiles) for all data transmitted between notification weeks 
23 and 29, 2006 (the notification weeks of the World Cup period) 
with the transmission delay for the same time period in 2005, when 
weekly transmission was in place.
Results
Daily transmission of mandatory notification data
Table 1 gives comparative data for transmission delay in days 
(25th, 50th and 75th percentiles) for data transmitted between 
notification weeks 23 and 29, in the years 2005 and 2006.
T a b l e  1
Mandatory notification data transmission delay (in days) 
for years 2005 and 2006 in World Cup cities




In the period of enhanced surveillance, RKI received 69 World 
Cup-associated, electronically transmitted cases of gastroenteritis. 
Of those, 62 were norovirus infections (61 with an epidemiological 
link to a norovirus outbreak in Munich), 4 salmonella infections 
cases and 3 were cases of campylobacter infections.
One event (not associated to the World Cup) was detected neither 
by daily transmission of mandatory notification data nor by the 
written reports submitted to RKI. A single case of meningococcal 
disease in Bavaria was identified through daily routine screening of 
press sources for infectious-disease related events. The local health 
department had detected the case early and immediately began 
contact tracing and postexposure prophylaxis, but reported the case 
electronically to the SHD and the RKI with delay. Since this case was 
not connected with the World Cup, and was not relevant for IHR, the 
local health department did not include it in their daily reports or flag 
it as World Cup-related in the electronic data transmission system. 
World Cup related infectious disease events: norovirus outbreak 
in the Munich International Broadcast Centre (IBC)
On 15 June the local health department in Munich was informed 
of a cluster of patients with gastrointestinal symptoms. That evening, 
the local health department took initial hygiene measures (see 
below), and the following day, within the first week after onset of 
the first case, the outbreak was reported via the additional, non-
case definition-bound reporting system to the RKI. Patients came 
from several countries, including Mexico and the United States. All 
patients were temporarily employed at the IBC. Hygiene precautions, 
such as disinfecting surfaces and providing hand disinfection liquids 
in sanitary areas, were immediately implemented, and multilingual 
information leaflets giving hygiene advice were distributed within 
the IBC. Large-scale stool diagnostics were performed. The first 
five stool samples were proven to be positive for norovirus. Later, 
a sequential analysis detected genotype GGII.4-2006a. Altogether, 
61 cases of gastroenteritis were epidemiologically linked to the 
norovirus outbreak in Munich. By the end of the second week of 
June 2006, the outbreak had come to an end.
Other infectious disease events during the World Cup
The World Cup coincided with the largest measles outbreak ever 
reported in Germany. This had raised concerns by the Pan American 
Health Organisation (PAHO) and various European national public 
health institutes which issued travel warnings for visitors to the 
World Cup events in Germany. Between 1 January and 7 June 2006 
(the date when the enhanced World Cup surveillance began), a total 
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of 1406 measles cases were reported in North Rhine-Westphalia, 
primarily from cities of the Ruhr region and from the Lower Rhine 
region which borders the Netherlands. Genotyping revealed D6 as 
the predominant measles genotype in this region. During the World 
Cup period, the total number of measles cases since January 2006 
rose to 1625, but no case of measles associated with the World Cup 
was observed during the enhanced World Cup surveillance. 
Another coincidental event during the World Cup was an 
outbreak of haemolytic uraemic syndrome (HUS) in the federal 
states of North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, Hamburg and 
Schleswig-Holstein in Northern Germany. Between 4 April and 6 
July 2006, 15 cases of HUS were notified. Of these, only two occurred 
during the World Cup period. None was epidemiologically linked to 
the World Cup. Table 2 summarises the major public health relevant 
infectious disease events during the World Cup.
Communication
Participation in non case-definition based daily reporting by the 
affected local and state health departments was 100%. Telephone 
conferences were held at the beginning and ending of the trial week 
for the World Cup surveillance, and immediately before, during and 
after the World Cup period. After the World Cup, the majority of 
World Cup surveillance stakeholders agreed that communication 
and interaction between the local and state health departments 
and RKI has been considerably strengthened during the enhanced 
surveillance period. 
Weather monitoring
The World Cup weather was pleasant and warm, with a 
temperature range in between 14 and 34 degrees Celsius (maximum 
day temperature). A heat wave comparable to that of 2003 was not 
observed during the tournament. Analysis of daily weather data did 
not find any temperature-related correlation to any public health 
relevant events in the World Cup cities. 
Discussion
 ‘Public health surveillance should be implemented at mass 
gatherings to facilitate rapid detection of outbreaks and other 
health-related events and enable public health teams to respond 
with timely control measures….’. This was recommended in a recent 
CDC-published journal article [12]. Infectious disease surveillance is 
an important subset of public health surveillance, but why and how 
should it be increased at mass events?
It is worth considering which characteristics of mass events might 
increase the risk of infectious diseases. Table 3 summarises these 
characteristics, along with examples of different types of event.
Of the published results of surveillance at mass events, it is 
interesting to note that few identified any significant increase in 
infectious disease occurrences during the period studied. No increase 
in usage of healthcare services was found during the 1998 World 
Cup in France [5]. The evaluation of surveillance during the Euro 
2004 football tournament in Portugal found no effect on numbers of 
infections in either visitors or the local population [22]. Two positive 
examples found were norovirus cases in a Virginia camping event 
[12], and the change in profile of sexually transmitted infection 
clinic attendances during the Sydney Olympic Games. During the 
millennium year in Rome, with 26 million visitors to the city, an 
increase in Legionella cases and foodborne outbreaks in foreign 
tourists was observed, but no increase was seen in overall cases or 
in cases in the local population [23]. 
Enhanced surveillance at mass gatherings has previously been 
conducted by a number of public health specialists organising 
preparations for such events. Syndrome-based surveillance has been 
undertaken at several previous mass gatherings [2-6]. However, at the 
current time, it is not clear whether, in regions with a well-functioning 
surveillance system in place, a syndrome-based system provides more 
than minimal additional information that is not identifiable through 
routine surveillance. Poor specificity and difficulties in determining 
epidemic thresholds are the most important limitations of syndromic 
surveillance [24,25]. In a study from the United Kingdom, syndromic 
surveillance data gained by National Health Service (NHS) direct 
calls using diarrhoea as a proxy for cryptosporidiosis were unable 
to detect a large scale local cryptosporidiosis outbreak [26]. During 
the 2006 Winter Olympic Games in Italy, syndromic surveillance did 
not provide any additional information that could not be identified 
through the pre-existing routine surveillance system [2].
More evidence-based research on the effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness of syndromic surveillance at mass gatherings is 
needed, especially given the high cost of implementation. After 
careful consideration in consultation with the local and state health 
departments and in the light of a lack of documented outbreaks 
detected by syndrome surveillance that would not have been detected 
by routine surveillance alone, it was assumed that the enhanced 
mandatory notification surveillance system would be sufficient, and 
a syndrome-based surveillance system was not implemented for the 
2006 World Cup in Germany. 
T a b l e  2
Major public health relevant infectious disease events during FIFA World Cup 2006, Germany, in chronological order
Event: Date of onset/













June 4: Indonesian journalist with varicella virus 
infection (chicken pox) lands at Munich airport and 
reports immediately to local PH authorities
Varicella virus 1 Yes Yes Yes LHD 
daily report
June 9: eight members of Croatian football 
team with gastrointestinal symptoms, subfebrile 
temperature; no diagnostic samples taken; 




8 Yes No Yes Lay press 
screening, ECDC 
teleconference
June 15: Laboratory confirmed case of mumps in 
a 23 year old man from the UK who had visited 
World Cup match in Frankfurt on June 10 
Mumps virus 1 Yes Yes No LHD 
daily report
June 16 - 29: 22 persons from different countries 
working at the International Broadcasting Centre 
(IBC) in Munich with gastroenteritic symptoms; 
altogether, 61 persons with epidemiological link; 
stool samples show norovirus in majority of 
cases; sequencing detects genotype GGII.4-2006a
Norovirus 61 Yes Yes Yes LHD 
daily report 
June 25: Australian fan hospitalised with acute 
Salmonella Enteritidis gastroenteritis; visits 
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Our aim was to monitor all public health relevant events in order 
to distribute timely information to all stakeholders and thus to be 
able to respond immediately to events of public health concern. 
The enhanced surveillance system allowed us to timely detect a 
World Cup related norovirus outbreak with consequences for 
IHR. It seems quite likely that due to the improved alertness and 
communication conditions during enhanced surveillance (daily 
local health department reports, immediate telephone contacts) 
this outbreak was detected more quickly on the federal level than it 
would have been without enhanced surveillance in place. 
The implementation of daily instead of weekly notification data 
transmission proved to be a successful strategy of accelerating 
transmission [Table 1] and was well-accepted by the participating 
local health departments of the World Cup cities. The state of North 
Rhine-Westphalia, the most heavily populated state in Germany, has 
continued daily transmission of notification data since the World 
Cup, with the majority of local health departments participating. 
Maintaining daily data transmission frequency could be problematic 
in small, resource-poor rural local health departments. Nevertheless, 
daily rather than weekly data transmission for all local and state 
health departments - routinely, not only during mass events - should 
be recommended as a future goal. 
Introducing an additional, sensitive, non-case definition-based 
additional written report system was overall beneficial. Additional 
information which complemented daily transmission of notifiable 
data reached RKI in a timely manner. Daily reporting was practicable 
for local and state health departments and RKI and served as 
a method of increasing less formal, but nonetheless valuable, 
communication between the different levels of public health. We 
therefore recommend additional reporting systems that are flexible 
and not bound to case-definitions, provided that at least one case-
definition system or syndrome-based system is in place.
Analysing the benefits of enhancing a pre-existing system of 
notification data surveillance versus introducing a syndromic 
surveillance system is difficult, since we lack comprehensive data 
from syndromic surveillance. Nevertheless, enhanced World Cup 
surveillance was found to accelerate data transmission and was 
clearly able to intensify communication and action-orientated 
cooperation between different players in the German public health 
system; therefore, it also benefited the routine infectious disease 
surveillance in Germany and provided a valuable communication and 
networking exercise for potential critical health-related events.
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